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Abstract 
This paper discusses and promotes the application of formal method approach in the development of high integrity transport 
systems. It briefly addresses the problems of the design and implementation of safety-critical, real-time control systems in 
transport systems. With the introduction of the concepts of the formal methods, the software development process is explained 
and the advantages of simple translation and eliminations of hidden defects are highlighted. A simple example on railway 
signalling is then given to demonstrate the application of formal methods in high integrity transport system. 
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1. Introduction  
Continuing transport demand has driven passenger railways toward higher speed and density in China and 
worldwide. While transport efficiency is improving, assuring safety gradually takes on a rightfully prominent role. 
Safety of the railway transport directly links to the lives and wellbeing of a large number of passengers and 
consequences of safety violation may lead to excessive casualty.  
Understanding and managing safety is now a crucial issue for operators and regulatory authorities and it needs to 
be urgently addressed. The application of advanced software control systems is an effective means of improving 
transport safety and efficiency, but when the large-scale real-time control systems in railways (especially software-
based systems) become more complex with growing functionalities and/or add-on features, the implications of the 
design of these systems on overall system safety and assurance of safety have to be fully established.  
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From the investigations of a number of severe railway incidents in recent years and the analysis of the available 
data of the Train Control System (TCS) used on-board, besides poor safety management, the failure of the control 
system software has been one of the major reasons that caused system failure, leading to degradation of service 
quality, loss of revenue or even fatalities.  The major technical defects in the design of software of TCS included: 
x Quality control of the core software throughout the system development process (NPSSAB, 2013) – System 
development has not stringently followed the development methods and processes required for high integrity 
software system, nor quality assurance and safety reviews been conductedaccording to the relevant high integrity 
industry standards.  
x The modern industrial development trend of increasing dependency on computer and software systems 
challenges the traditional method of system safety engineering – The defects of the requirements, design faults 
and incorrect implementation are the main causes to the failure of large-scale high-integrity computer control 
systems. 
The paper attempts to address the aforementioned problem by introducing the formal method approach to 
represent the functionalities of a railway system, which on its own a high-integrity, safety-critical entity, and their 
inter-dependencies and relationships to deliver the desired operations in order to provide a traceable and accountable 
approach to understand, plan and manage safety of the system. 
2. State of the Art  
Traditional software engineering approaches, such as object-oriented design (OOD) methods represented by 
Unified Modeling Language (UML), break down a system into smaller modules and subsystems. It simplifies the 
design and development of a complex system so thatsystem development and testing are based on modules of more 
manageable size. To a certain extent, they improve overall software quality and reliability. However, when 
developing large and complex systems, there is tremendous difficulty in addressing the link between the abstract 
design and the realisation of thedesign.  The resulting graphical design models are often either too abstract or too 
specific. For the too abstract graphic design, it is difficult to transit from design to specific system implementation. 
On the other hand, designers have to spend a substantial amount of time and effort in constructing the graphical 
design models from system requirements when the design is too specific.  
The transition from design models toimplementation carriessignificant impact on software quality. For example, 
the "7•23" incident report (NPSSAB, 2013) points out that the deficiency of the design documentation and 
inconsistencies between the design and implementation have profound consequences on the quality of the software. 
This is mainly due to human errors when manually translating the symbolic or graphical design models into 
implementation, eventually leading to the unforeseen introduction of defects into the design and jeopardising the 
quality of resulting software. 
In the security or safety-critical system industries as railway transport, the formal methods has been increasingly 
popular in the design and development of large-scale safety-critical software systems as numerous applications are 
found in a variety of European safety critical control systems (Altran-Praxis, 2013) and the French High-Speed Rail 
Control system developed by GEC-ALSTHOM Transport (Qiu, 2010). Formal methods is an effective way to 
improve the quality of large-scale software and reduce the cost of software development, as depicted in the methods 
represented by Roscoe et al. (2010), Woodcock (1991), Hoare (2004), and SCADE (Esterel, 2003). Because of its 
simplicity, together with the support tools, most formal methods allow system designers to invest theirenergy in the 
actual functionalities of the system and application logic, and facilitate swift but tracable transition from design to 
implementation. Fortheir precise description and definition of system functions and requirements, formal methods 
also enableaccountable validation and verification of the resultingsystem, which reducesor even eliminates possible 
defects in the software and thus better maintains safety of the system. 
3. Formal Methods  
In this section, the process of applying formal methods at each phase of the development cycle of software for 
safety-critical systems is given (Cai, 2005).  In order to utilise the advantages of formal modelling and facilitate the 
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development process of the high integrity railway systems, the illustrationsof applyingformal methods for each 
development phase are provided.  
3.1. Design  
The commonly used forms to describe the requirements of a a high integrity railway system are text descriptions, 
OOD models such as UML, and formal models such as Z, CSP and Petri-net etc.   Different combinations are also 
possible, B methods (Evans et al., 2013) and SCADE (Esterel, 2003) are good examples. Different forms of 
languages have their advantages and disadvantages when they are used to specify the high integrity railway systems. 
Based on the nature of these systems such as the level of safety and security requirements, the suitable techniques 
according to industry standards such as Do-178 (RTCA, 2013a, 2013b) are adopted.   For systems in which their 
failure might cause substantialfatality and financial loss, the use of formal method is preferredor even compulsory as 
required by relevant industry standards.  
The graphic notations have the advantages of easy understanding and simple specification of the overall structure 
of the systems. However, it requires substantial efforts to specify the detailed design which could become very 
difficult to maintain asthe design is iterated and thus modified frequently during the early development stage. It is 
also not particularly helpfulfor specifying low level designs which require detailed descriptions. Text forms are good 
at describing designs in details, but they lackthe ability to specify structures and inherit the problem of ambiguity. 
Formal notations provide clarification of the design but the misgiving is the poor specification of the systemstructure. 
Current practice prefers the combination of graphical notation with formal semantics. SCADE is one 
example.Frompractical experiences, this combinationreaps the benefits of pulling their advantages to complement 
one another. 
For example, to specify the time elapsed in a system, the following description forms are given.  
Text descriptions: The timing facilities that can be used to check the clock after a given time.  
Graphic notation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 the Graphic notation 
Formal notation:   “Time” are specified in Z. 
The following “Time” object is specified in Z together with the compare-function to enable checkson the clock 
after a given time:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 the “Time” object 
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The highlights of using formal methods at the design phase are: 
x The combined descriptions (text, graphic notations and formal notations) are required. The formal notation is 
compulsory for the critical part of high integrity transport systems. The subset of graphic notation is essential to 
specify the architecture of the systems. It is preferable to use the graphic notations only for essential architecture 
design and minimize their use for detailed design.  It will reduce the maintenance efforts of the systems. 
x Safety properties need to be considered and specified by formal languages. The formal specifications enable easy 
verification that the safety properties are solidly held. 
3.2. Implementation  
At this phase, the design is translated into implementation languages (Cai and Wellings, 2004, 2005).  The clear 
mapping between the design and coding is essential to guarantee functionality correctness of the systems and thus 
the quality of the software. 
The keys of applying formal methods at the implementation phase are: 
x The clear mapping between the formal specification and the implementation are required. 
x It is preferable that the transfer from the formal model to the implementation is carried out manually by an 
experienced team so that the specification faults and deficiency of the design could be identified, recorded and 
fixed as early as possible, which will greatly reduce the development cost at the later stage. 
x During the mapping process, that the implementation matches the design functionally and structurally must be 
ensured. It should again be accomplished manually by the engineers during implementation. 
It is possible to transfer the formal model into the implementation with the aid of automatic tools such as the 
approach chosen by SCADE (Esterel, 2003). However, the manual translation is preferred as the specification and 
design faults could be identified as this stage, preventing the faults from sneaking into next stages. It will greatly 
improve the quality of the software and reduce the costs dramatically for fixing bugs at the later development cycles. 
Here is an example of mapping the time specified in Z to the programming languages SPARK Ada. The code in 
Ada is: 
---   it is to implement the formal model 
---   schema Time specified in Z  
package body Time 
is 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-- LessThan  “<”  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
functionLessThan ( Left, Right : TimeT ) return Boolean 
is 
begin 
return (Left.Year<Right.Year)  or 
(Left.Year = Right.YearandLeft.Month<Right.Month )or 
(Left.Year = Right.YearandLeft.Month = Right.MonthandLeft.Day<Right.Day)or 
 (Left.Year= Right.YearandLeft.Month = Right.MonthandLeft.Day = Right.Day 
andLeft.MilliSec<Right.MilliSec); 
endLessThan; 
endTime; 
The above codesimplement thedesign Time’specified in Z. The above comment area specifies that the codesare 
so set up thatthe mapping link between design and implementation is established. In term of coding, they are also 
structurally matching the specification. It will greatly improve the readability,thus debugging and subsequent 
modifications.   
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3.3. Testing 
The formal models give the clarified requirements of the system together with those safety requirements. Based 
on the formal requirements, the test harness can be built to cover all the required functional and non-functional 
requirements. The formal models give the test team non-ambiguous descriptions of how the systems should perform, 
which facilitates the testing process free of any issue of ambiguous descriptions of the design. Incomplete testing is 
one of the main factors affecting the reliability of the system. The report of a previous incident (NPSSAM, 2013) 
mentions that when abnormal condition occurs, the software design does not properly trigger the necessary fail-safe 
measures. If the system tests use the full system coverage for their formal model which includes the tests of the 
errors under all possible operation conditions, the defects of the system can be identified effectively.   
The purpose of using formal methods at the testing phase is: 
x The full coverage of the testing and verification of the formal model including the exception and error handing 
scenario are required.  
3.4. Verification and validation 
The testing methods based on test cases are limited and they do not cover all the possible states. The automated 
software validation based on formal methods such as Z and high integrity languages such as SPARK Ada (Roscoe et 
al, 2010; Altran-Praxis, 2013; Woodcock, 1991) can make use of the advantages of formal proof of all possible 
states. From the system design, based on the overall requirement of system, the complete test of the correctness of 
the system realisation (source code) and design integrity, including abnormal state testing, as well as most system 
reliability requirements can be automatically verified.  
The objective of using formal methods at the verification and validation phase is: 
x Certain safety proprieties of the systems specified in the formal model can be automatically verified by advanced 
verifiable compiler or advanced development toolset.  It is preferable to take the advantage of these certified 
verifiable toolsets to facilitate the development and enhance the benefits of using formal methods to those safety 
critical systems. 
x A railway signal interlocking control example below will show the advantages of applying formal methods and 
the automatic verifying tools.  These tools underline the merits of formal methods and allow the safety and 
functional properties to be proven during the development process from the design to the final implementation. 
4. An Example 
A simple example of representing two signalling rules in interlock control by formal methods is given here to 
illustrate the smooth transition from textual rules to software coding and the possible elimination of unforeseen 
built-in defects in the process. 
The following rules stipulate the process with which a track section can be released upon the occurrence of a fault. 
SRS39 - Under interlocking, the process tR release a track section upon fault is put in place with the following 
exceptions. 
i) All sections occupied and controlled by track circuits 
ii) The section ahead of an entry point 
SRS40 - A track section is released when the signal is in 'open' state and a train is approaching the signal. If the 
signal is in 'closed' state upon fault, the release process only commences after a pre-defined time period after the 
fault. 
In the design stage, the text descriptions are first converted into graphical notation, and then the formal notation 
in Z. 
The sequence diagram is as follows: 
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Fig.3 the sequence diagram 
 
Formal notation: The operation ReleaseTrackSectionUponFault is specified in Z 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4 the formal notation 
 
where signal, track are specified in Z as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5 the track are specified in Z  
 
The two rules can then be realised with the following Spark-Ada codes. 
1    ---------------------------------------- 
2    -- It is the implementation of 
3     -- schema Release Track Section Upon Fault 
4    ---------------------------------------- 
5 Procedure Release_Track_Section_Upon_Fault 
Status : {Open, Close} 
 
Occupied : { true, false } 
TrainApproaching : { true, false } 
TrackSectio
Signal 
SignalState 
s? : Signal;  ts : TrackSection;  allSections : PTrackSection 
s.Status = Open 
sec :TrackSection_ secęallSectionsƽsec.Occupied=false 
ts.Occupied=false 
ts.TrainApproaching=false  
ReleaseTrackSectionUponFau
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6       (sec:       in     Track_Section; 
7        all_Secs : in     Track_Sections; 
8        s:         in out Signal) 
9        --#pres.Status=Open; 
10   is 
11      All_Secs_Occupied : Boolean; 
12   begin 
13      All_Secs_Occupied = True; 
14      for I in Integer range 1..all_Secs.Count loop 
15        if not all_Secs(i).Occupied then 
16            All_Secs_Occupied = False; 
17         end if; 
18      exit when not All_Secs_Occupied; 
19       end loop; 
20       -- the condition “S.Status=Open” will be guaranteed by all 
21       -- the callers of this procedure (verified by SPARK Tools). 
22       if not (All_Secs_Occupied or 
23               sec.Occupied or 
24               sec.Train_Approaching) 
25       then 
26          S.Status = Close; 
27       end if; 
28   end Release_Track_Section_Upon_Fault; 
 
The safety and functional requirement of releasing track section upon faults are described by SRS30 and SRS40. 
They are further refined as the conditions in the schema ReleaseTrackSectionUponFault.  Part of the conditions 
defined in schema is mapped into implementation as the code line from L22 to L24.  One of the condition 
‘s.Status=Open’ in schema ReleaseTrackSectionUponFault is not included as the executable code (Line22 to Line24) 
because it will be verified by the automatic verifying tools (as specified in Line 9) that all the calling points will 
satisfy the condition ‘s.Status=Open’ before invoking the procedure Release_Track_Section_Upon_Fault. It means that 
only when the signal is in ‘Open’ state and then the track sections can possibly be released. It is also possible to 
specify the conditions from L22 to L24 as the condition specified in Line 9 and also add the condition “s.Status=off” 
as the post-condition of the procedure Release_Track_Section_Upon_Fault and the full safety and functional 
requirements can be automatically verified.  However, very complex calling functions are required to consider all 
possible cases before calling Release_Track_Section_Upon_Fault. In practice, it is necessary to balance the effort on 
coding during development and planting adequate handles for verifying the essential safety-critical properties 
through model checking at the design and implementation level by automatic verifying toolsets. 
5. Expected Benefits 
In general, some high integrity systems are developed based on graphic notions and non-critical software 
development methods are applied to high integrity software system development. However, it becomes more 
difficult to maintain those systems as the complexities of the graphic models expand drastically with the increasing 
complexity of the systems.  As a result, safety is eventually compromised. 
With formal methods, a clear mapping between the formal model and their implementation is possible.  It will 
substantially reduce the possibility of overseen faults that might occur during system updates. It is therefore easy to 
check the changes required to keep the consistency of the formal design model and implementation. During the 
long-term development of the systems, the cost will be reduced and quality is also guaranteed. With the assistance of 
advanced development toolsets, the safety requirements can be specified in the formal design model, and they can 
be mapped into the implementation languages and automatically verified with suitable tools. Verifying the safety 
properties of the systems is then made much easier.   
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6. Future Works 
In this paper, the applicationof formal method in high integrity railway systems at the design, implementation, 
testing and verification phasesare discussed. It illustrates the potential of formal methods as the toolsto develop the 
risk assessment and risk management regimes, which are to be integratedinto the high integrity software system 
development (Bristish Standard, 2001; Hoare, 2004; Leveson & Shimeall, 1991; Esteral, 2003). This approach will 
establish effective design methods for system safety assurance and utilize appropriate technologies and processes to 
significantlyimprove the overall system safety. 
Modern large-scale software systems usually have a large variety of safety subsystems. It is necessary to ensure 
system safety integrity through a systematic design method. The "7.23" incident report (NPSSAB, 2013) mentioned 
that data acquisition unit is more vulnerable to environmental interference. Itis often required to process data from a 
number of redundant subsystems with low integrity level before passing the results to subsystems with high integrity 
to guarantee the safety of the whole system.  As a result, a complete framework for the development of large high-
integrity software systems from design to the system realisation with integrated system safety engineering is 
urgently called for. Formal methods faciltiates the process to achieve the conversion from formal model to system 
application architecture, including a valid parallel processing method, safety analysis, with a stringent and traceable 
framework. 
It becomes more evident nowadays that with the systems architectures, the software is split into two main entities: 
the software which performs the safety critical functions and then a "safety monitor" that double checks that the 
output from the main software to ensure the output is safe. These safety monitor applications are where formal 
notation, in particular Z, is very useful because: 
a) safety monitors are generally small 
b) safety monitors normally involve checking a high number of logical conditions  
c) safety monitors do not normally have excessively abundant algorithms. 
To address the safety concerns of the China Train Control Systems (CTCS) (NPSSAB, 2013; CTCS, 2013a, 
2013b), the future works includetwo practical applications of safety monitoring in the railway industry using formal 
methods as case studies. The first application is the train collision prevention systems at large, named Real-Time 
Train Collision Prevention Systems (RTCPS), and the second is a safety monitor for onboard Automated Train 
Protection (ATP) system. The detailed comparisons, in terms of ultimate safety assurance impact and 
implementation flexibility, between the use of model-based engineering (MBE) and formal engineering methods for 
large real-time and critical systems will be investigated. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, the application of formal methods at the design phase, implementation, testing and verification 
phase of high integrity railway system development is discussed with the merits are highlighted with a simple 
example. Concepts of formal methods have been very well established in the areas of software engineering and thus 
well proven in practical real-time systems. Having recognised that railway system, being a large-scale, complex and 
real-time control operation and in insatiable demand of safety, railway researchers and engineers should start 
exploring the benefits of formal methods in developing safety-critical software systems (Cai and Wu, 2013). 
Signalling, interlock and train control are on the forefront of the applications. 
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